Abstract: Cognitive science and its philosophy have been far too long consumed with representation. This concern is indicative of a creeping Cartesianism that many scientists and philosophers wish to evade. However, their naturalism is often insufficiently evolutionary to fully appreciate the lessons of pragmatism. If cognitive neuroscience and pragmatism are to be mutually beneficial, the representational-friendly scientists and the anti-representational pragmatists need an alternative to representation that still accounts for what many find so attractive about representation, namely intentionality. I propose that instead of representations we philosophers and scientists begin thinking in terms of cultural affordances. Like Gibsonian affordances, cultural affordances are opportunities for action. However, unlike Gibsonian affordances, which are merely biological and available for immediate action in the immediately present environment, cultural affordances also present opportunities for thinking about the past and acting into the future-tasks typically attributed to representations.
Cognitive scientists are often fond of talking about how the brain represents the world. Philosophers of mind and neurophilosophers are similarly keen to promote a representational theory of mind. This perspective is due to the influence of underlying and often unrecognized Cartesian assumptions about the nature of mentality. Despite claims from most of these thinkers that Cartesianism is the enemy, that substance dualism is no longer taken seriously, etc., there remains a creeping Cartesianism in the form of representation. Pragmatism, from its very start in the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce through its many varieties from William James and John Dewey to Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, has been adamantly anti-Cartesian and anti-representational.
1 A recent variety of pragmatism, neuropragmatism, contends that the current advances in the neurosciences come remarkably close to many of the insights of early pragmatism (especially Dewey's) and believes that areas of current debate are well-addressed by the tools of pragmatism and that pragmatism benefits from the HUMAN AFFAIRS 23, 594-605, 2013 DOI: 10.2478 insights and tools of neuroscience. Since there are neuroscientists who utilize the concept of representation, and since neuropragmatism, like its ancestors, is anti-representational, neuropragmatists are faced with a possible conflict. They have three options. The first, and least attractive because unproductive, is for neuropragmatists and neuroscientists to agree to disagree on representations. The second and somewhat popular approach is to find some mutually beneficial way to talk about representations and pragmatism. The final option-the one I defend here-is to imagine an alternative way to inquire that does not depend on representation. I call this alternative a cultural affordance, which is based on the more-or-less biological sense introduced by Gibson and elaborated upon by others (see Noë 2004, and Chemero 2009 ) but with a temporal twist. This option is not only critical of a representational theory of mind or brain, it is also constructive: it seeks to evade the threat of creeping Cartesianism. My trajectory begins with an overview of representationalism. I then put forth a general pragmatist critique of representationalism. To be clear, I do not defend any particular pragmatist's criticism of Cartesianism or representationalism; though I do draw on my pragmatist ancestor's tools, notably Dewey's conceptions of situation and experience. Finally, I outline an alternative to representationalism that makes use of recent work in ecological psychology, and enactive, embodied, and embedded theories of cognition. This alternative, cultural affordance, is proposed in order to expand upon work being done in these areas.
On representation
The representational theory of mind has its origins in Descartes' opposition between the immaterial mind and the material world. This separation created a veil of ideas which vainly mediated the mental world and the physical world. The mind could only learn about the external world by passively witnessing the barrage of ideas or sensations (or sense data) that appeared on this veil. It was supposed that such data somehow corresponded to the external world and was thereby represented in the mind thanks to the benevolence of a creator god.
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Take away this supposition, and knowledge itself becomes a problem. For Kant especially, the problem was how the knowledge produced by natural science was possible in the first place. Kant's proposed solution continued the stark divide between mind or experience and the things-in-themselves. This divide is challenged by Darwinian evolution. However, this challenge has only been partly met. Most working scientists and philosophers of mind operate under the banner of naturalism. Whatever is meant by naturalism, one of its defining features is the rejection of supernatural forces and explanations (see Shook 2011 and Price 2013) . Thus the divine beneficence, which has kept the correspondence relation between mind and world together, no longer holds. Yet the role representation plays in our scientific attempts to inquire into cognition remains for most of these scientists and philosophers.
This on-going and dominant interest in representation comes in many forms. As Hugh Clapin discusses in his introduction to an edited volume on representation (2002), there are several varieties of representation discussed, from the linguistically based to the strictly pictorial (see also Price 2013) . Nevertheless, the value of representation has more recently been recognized as potentially problematic for cognitive science, as Giovanni Pezzulo has not only observed but also tried to resist (see Pezzulo 2008; and Solymosi and Shook 2014, forthcoming) . Despite the differences across understandings of representation, there remains a commonality that is not sufficiently criticized. The primacy given to the individual mind and the individual brain is an atavism of creeping Cartesianism-a privilege no longer warranted after Darwin. Consider Clapin's straightforward description of cognitive science. He writes:
Generally speaking, cognitive science has assumed a hierarchically reductionist picture of mental explanation. Social properties are composed of, and explained by, persons with minds; minds are composed of, and explained by, neurons, and so on down to physics (2002, 17) .
True, cognitive science rejects the substance dualism of Cartesianism and replaces it with a reductive hierarchy that holds an ontological supremacy of the lowest level. On the hierarchy proffered by Clapin, individual neurons precede individual brains, which precede individual minds, which precede society.
Indeed cognitive science is not simply the inquiry into how (human) minds work; it is easily and frequently conceived as a science of representation. Clapin closes his introduction to his volume on mental representation with the following:
If I were to draw a single conclusion from this collection, it would be this: cognitive sciencethe representational science of mind-has nothing like a clear and universal concept of representation and this fact is holding it back. This isn't merely a point about linguistic usage, of course. The problem is that we don't fully understand what external representation is, we can't agree on what intentionality is, and we have little idea of what inner states deserve to be called representational. (2002, 19-20, emphasis in original) With all of this, I agree. With what Clapin goes on to say, however, I strongly disagree. He continues, "This isn't as negative a conclusion as it may appear," suggesting that the on-going discussion and debate are signs of progress. I see them as signs of duress, due to a nefarious and creeping Cartesianism at the heart of the entire enterprise of cognitive science qua representational science of mind.
My concerns begin with the naïve evolutionary view that privileges individuals over society. The implications of this privilege are not easily appreciated, nor do I intend to exhaust them in this essay. Rather, I intend to challenge the very conception of mind as primarily individual, isolated (or private), and representational. This challenge takes up an evolutionary perspective that is deliberately heavy-handed but is not to be mistaken for a typical evolutionary psychological perspective. For example, evolutionary psychology maintains the focus on individual minds, as well as an unwarranted presumption that human evolution stopped in the Neolithic era, despite the radical alteration of human environments over the last 10,000 years.
To transition to this challenge, a charitable consideration of why the representational theory of mind is attractive is in order. The historical sketch of the idea does not do service to the intuitions that drive cognitive science today-intuitions which deserve scrutiny. A person seems to believe his or her mind is representational because what he or she experiences-that is, what he or she observes through his or her senses, thinks about, or imagines-is about something, usually the world or some permutation of it. That is, a person's thoughts, ideas, beliefs, imaginings, and musements are all internal to his or her mind, yet such internal and mental "things" (states or events) are about what is external to that mind and that person. This mark of intentionality seems quite palatable if one's intuitions include the immateriality of mind. Of course, this leads to the veil of ideas and the problem of knowledge as noted above (viz., if mind is internal and immaterial, how can it know in any meaningful and reliable way that which is external to it and ontologically opposed to it?).
4 "Of course," so many of us are intuitively inclined to assert, "my mind represents the world that exists independently of me." When it is an entity free from the reach of material or natural science, all one ultimately has to go on is one's intuition and first-hand experience. Once we reject that substance dualism (something we do everyday in our lived experience of doing meaningful activities with our bodies in our worlds), the very idea of a clean distinction between that which is internal and that which is external is problematic. If there is no clear boundary between me and the world, what use is it to speak of my "mind" as representational? My answer, as should be clear, is that there is very little if any use to speaking of mind as representational. However, this is not to say that I reject mind as intentional. Mind is about the world; it is just not about it in the way we have become so comfortable in accepting.
Evolving situations: experience as transactional, social and individual
To appreciate the challenge to cognitive science orthodoxy which grants individuality a primacy over sociality, consider what I have been calling the neuropragmatist motto (Solymosi 2011, Solymosi and Shook 2013) , from John Dewey's Experience and Nature:
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but as events are in history, in a moving, growing never finished process (Dewey 1925/LW1: 224) .
The problems which haunt philosophy have been for the last several centuries varieties of the problem of knowledge and mind-body/world interaction, both consequences of substance dualism. Dewey's claim is that these problems are solved (either by resolution or dissolution) when we take up a nested hierarchy of affairs.
This hierarchy is further elaborated by Dewey's conception of experience. Here I share a few of his remarks on experience as platforms from which I may or may not depart from any consensus on what Dewey may have really meant. First, "experience… is something that occurs only under highly specialized conditions, such as are found in a highly organized creature which in turn requires a specialized environment" (ibid., 12). Dewey continues, It is not experience which is experienced, but nature -stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object -the human organism -they are how things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth (ibid., 12-13).
This certain way of interacting between things is later emphasized biologically as organism and environment-experience is "the manifestation of the interaction of organism and environment" or simply "an interaction of organism and environment" (Dewey 1939a/ LW14:16)-and culturally as human transaction:
If one asks what is meant by experience in this connection my reply is that it is that free interaction of individual human beings with surrounding conditions, especially the human surroundings, which develops and satisfies need and desire by increasing knowledge of things as they are (Dewey 1939b/LW14: 229) .
Contrast this nested hierarchy of experience with the cognitive science orthodox hierarchy. The orthodoxy, as Clapin presents it, is that the most real is the lowest-level particles studied by physics. These particles compound into chemicals, which compound into cells, some of which are neurons, which compound into brains, which produce minds, whose relations produce society. The Deweyan nested hierarchy picks up with complex organisms interacting with complex environments. Eventually these interactions become so complex that they are notably human. The neuropragmatist motto is biologically focused on an organism in nature, but little is said about that nature. As the other passages from Dewey indicate, the interaction of human organisms with other human organisms in human environments is a phase of nature: experience has depth, it is in nature, and, in the form of human experience, it becomes cultural (Dewey 1925/LW1: 42, 361) . In other words, a human organism is not born into a non-cultural nature, becomes a psychological individual on its own accord (with full representational capacity), and then enters into social relations with other such individuals. A human organism is born into a socio-cultural environment, with a dynamic set of beliefs and practices about how to live with other humans and the non-human world. Through an early dependence on organisms older than itself, the newborn becomes a child, and eventually an adult. He or she never enters into social relations with others. To do so would suggest that he or she was somehow outside of society.
5 He or she only interacts in ever more sophisticated ways with others. These social relations are prior to any one human individual. Moreover, it is through social relations that individuals are cultivated. The orthodoxy of cognitive science is thus fundamentally flawed, in light of the deep evolutionary conception of experience promoted by early Darwinian philosophers and psychobiologists like Dewey. 6 5 As advances ranging from epigenetics and ecological niche construction to developmental psychology and social neuroscience indicate, there are socio-cultural effects in utero. 6 On early pragmatists and psychobiology, see Schulkin (2009 and . For more on how our evolutionary ancestors were social before H. sapiens ever were, see Sterelny (2012) .
Flawed as it is, the orthodox view in cognitive science may be able to adjust to my criticism while maintaining that individual minds are representational. Such minds may not be prior to social relations, the defender of orthodoxy may claim, but they are individuals and they-namely their brains-represent the world. There is a world that exists independently of any individual. This world is what is represented by mind (by which is all too often meant brain). To dismantle this intuition, another of Dewey's difficult conceptions-as any unfamiliar tool is at first-is particularly useful. Dewey's conception of situation is aimed particularly at a core common-sensical intuition of the representationalist.
The representationalist draws intuitive power from the presumption that organisms are clearly distinct from their environments. The convenient boundary for this distinction is made at the skin. Dewey rejects this intuition in the following passage where he elaborates his conception of the situation. He writes,
The earlier discussion set out with the familiar common sense distinction of organism and environment, and went on to speak of their interaction. Unfortunately, however, a special philosophical interpretation may be unconsciously read into the common sense distinction. It will then be supposed that organism and environment are "given" as independent things and interaction is a third independent thing which finally intervenes. In fact, the distinction is a practical and temporal one, arising out of the state of tension in which the organism at a given time, in a given phase of life-activity, is set over against the environment as it then and there exists. There is, of course, a natural world that exists independently of the organism, but this world is environment only as it enters directly and indirectly into life-functions. The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in active connections with its environment. Integration is more fundamental than is the distinction designated by interaction of organism and environment. The latter is indicative of a partial disintegration of a prior integration, but one which is of such a dynamic nature that it moves (as long as life continues) toward redintegration. (1938/LW12: 40, emphasis in original) The situation is the contextual whole in and through which experience-as the interaction of organism and environment-occurs as a natural phenomenon. It is prior to any distinction made between organism and environment: a distinction made for practical purposes. Furthermore, situations are qualitative as much as they are quantitative, for they are experienced wholes, in contradistinction to the veil of ideas in which sense data are atomistically related to one another in the mind, separate from the external world.
The strength of integration of organism and environment has more recently been recognized in evolutionary biology by theorists such as Paul E. Griffiths and Russell D. Gray (2001) . They have argued that in order to evade confusions over evolution with regard to an organism or to an environment, it is more accurate to conceive of the evolutionary unit as OE, the integration or entanglement of Organism-Environment. I have argued elsewhere at length that this conception of the evolutionary unit is in line with Dewey's conception of experience as organism-environment interaction or transaction (Solymosi 2013, Solymosi and Shook 2013) . Indeed, despite the previous Dewey passages in which the word interaction is used, I believe transaction better illustrates both the dynamic process of the organism-environment relation and the fundamental inseparability of organism and environment. Even though the prefix inter-implies a going-between organism and environment, trans-carries a sense of going through, across, and beyond the common sense limits of a skin boundary between organism and environment. Because each situation is idiosyncratic-which is not to say it is not possible to compare situations; certain general traits may become statistically relevant and meaningful-how a specific type of task or event is accomplished in any given situation may vary wildly due to practical, pragmatic, or design considerations.
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Since specific tokens of types of events or actions may vary significantly, the very idea of cognitive science as a science of representations becomes problematic. To study representations alone-whatever they may be, immaterial sense data, nerve impulses, dynamic patterns, ideas supervening on brain activity-without considering what is happening in the rest of the situation (i.e., the rest of the cortex, the whole of the brain, the brain in the body, the body in the environment) is to study something so divorced from experience as it is lived that one may as well try to understand global finance by observing a single hydrogen atom. But such a line of attack still leaves a place for representations in cognition or experience more broadly. In the next section, I turn to a reconstruction of intentionality that eliminates representation without eliminating lived experience.
About intentionality: introducing cultural affordances
The modern divorce of mind from world, or experience from nature, is undone by the Darwinian perspective initiated by pragmatists and emphasized here. Our experience is about the world because it is of the world. The phylogenetic development of OE-transaction is deep, perhaps originating with an unrecognized sense of survival value. In time, survival value was not the be all and end all of life functions. Instead human culture evolved as a novel phase of natural activity, in which humans could deliberately modify their bodies and environments in efforts to ameliorate their situations. This sense of experience as lived and improvable is difficult to reconcile with the modern conception of experience as a veil of ideas. The difficulties of contemporary representation remain, though in a context of brain-world.
Alva Noë points to current theories of vision which contend that the brain must build a representation of the world because all that we are learning about how vision works suggests that our experience of the world should be fragmented, phasing between color and black-and-white, and far more jarring (see Noë 2004, especially chapter 2, pp. 35-74) . The fragmentation comes from the various illusions we can create by setting up conditions that allow us to find the blind spots in our eyes due to the optical nerve's connection with the retina. Phasing between color vision and black-and-white vision is due to the unequal distribution of rods and cones in the eye. The jarring-ness is expected because the saccades of our eyes are constant: our eyes are never still. Yet our lived experience is one in which our visual field is not jarring, not color-phasing but uniformly colored, and not fragmented. Noë is critical of the orthodox view that the brain constructs a representation out of the various streams of data coming from the eyes. Such a view, he rightly notes, fails to take into consideration that the organism is actively involved with its surroundings, experimenting with its environment, in order to actively get about it-to educate itself and ameliorate its situation. Instead of constructing a representation, the brain coordinates various bodily systems and activities to accomplish specific tasks.
Noë's view is close to the pragmatist view I offer here. However, his discussion is focused primarily on perception, especially visual perception. He ably avails himself of Gibsonian affordances, integrating them into his enactive approach to perception. Yet the limits of the approach, such as it is focused on animals more generally, still leave a space for representationalists to maintain a use for representation. An imaginary proponent could conceivably grant the enactivist program with regard to ecological perceptions, but still insist that when it comes to uniquely human or cultural affairs, such as symbols or language use, representation is still necessary. After all, on the affordance approach, a flat surface is directly perceived as walkable to a featherless biped, but a book written in English is not directly perceived to just any language user: the book and its words are representations of ideas about the world.
The enactive approach to mind and experience sits well with embodied and embedded approaches. A central claim of these approaches is that with an environment chock-full of information, there is no need for the organism (or its nervous system) to represent the environment. All the organism needs are the skills to acquire that information when appropriate. What counts as appropriate is determined by the specifics of the situation. If there is a pressing need for certain sorts of immediate action, the difference between life and death may come down to whether one has (cultivated) the right habits for the occasion. In strictly biological yet non-cultural terms, this skills approach to perceiving-and-acting in the world works well. When it comes to more uniquely human characteristics, from musement to literature, where the action is not in the environment but seemingly in the mind/head/brain, the dismissal of representation becomes more difficult.
Daniel Dennett suggests that the biological beginnings of intentionality may be found in the lock-and-key-like aboutness of a neurotransmitter and its synapse (Dennett 1996, 35) . Of course, it is a long way from synapse to self, but there is a way. The shortcoming of Dennett's observation is that there is insufficient discussion of what that aboutness is for. How do the specific neurotransmitters and their specific synaptic connections relate to the world beyond the cell, the brain, or the body? Presumably, on Dennett's account, there are real patterns that operate globally on the brain. But the connectionist framework that allows for the brain dynamics to control the body still leaves room for a representation. It may not be between a single synapse and a single neurotransmitter; but the complex vector space is easily enough treated as a "representation" of sorts-a point both Paul and Patricia Churchland often make, despite their eliminativism (see Churchland 2002 and .
Huw Price takes up the lock-and-key metaphor to eliminate representation, changing the parameters from the neural level to organism and environment. He is proposing that we abandon the passive conception of representational content in favour of a more active, relational metaphor: that of the key, which is adapted at one end to the shape of the user, at the other end to the shape of some part of the environment (2013, 52) .
The mirror metaphor (in which mental ideas or neural patterns "mirror" or represent the external world) is to be eliminated and replaced by a key. The connection between the organism and the environment is made with a key, which presumably fits in the hand of the organism and in the lock of the environment. This is a step in the right direction, though there are at least two difficulties that arise from it. First, this key as a means of integrating the organism with the environment makes the common sense error that Dewey dismissed in his conception of the situation. The key is the third thing that brings together the two "givens" of organism and environment. Instead of simplifying matters, we are multiplying entities needlessly. The second difficulty is that Price does not utilize the metaphor to its fullest extent. That is, a key is not simply a connection between its user and the lock: it affords its user access to a new space; it creates new possibilities for action.
Communication-language especially-affords cultural organisms (namely, humans) access to new opportunities for action, from singing to science. Consider this passage from Dewey on the import of language and symbols:
In fact, ordered discourse does more than preserve and transmit the funded wisdom (and foolishness) of the past. It is the only agency by which reflection, inquiry, is liberated. Were it not for the invention and use of symbols, we should be tied to conditions immediately present; there would be no escape from the pressure exerted in direct interactions with things of the immediate local environment. It is through the agency of words that the present is brought into fruitful intercourse with the past and the future; that imaginative experimentation is rendered possible. Apart from words, past experiences are available only as they have entered into habits that are settled, fixed; by means of words, combinations are induced in which what has happened takes on a new and freer significance. Invention, projection of the new and different, depends upon ability to observe and take account of what is not locally and instantly present, and language is the sole author and administrator of this ability (Dewey 2012, 274) .
As an alternative to the use of the key metaphor proposed by Dennett and by Price, I propose that keys, literally and metaphorically, are a type of cultural affordance.
Language and symbols are the exemplars of this species of affordance; but they are by no means the only sort. Any human artifact or by-product of human activity that becomes a means of affording humans new opportunities for action is a cultural affordance. Like biological affordances, cultural ones make possible new ways of engaging the world. But they do so in a way that does not require nor does it restrict the organism to the immediacy of the merely biological. In other words, the limits of Noë's enactivism is that it is currently focused on perception of the environment alone. There is more to lived experience than active perception of one's surroundings-at least for humans. When that surrounding is a culture, filled with symbols, words, images, etc., there is a multiplication of information available for making a difference in action. But that information is only available to those organisms who have been cultivated to engage intelligently in those specific environments. One of the difficulties of a representational approach to perception is that there are real time constraints to activity if the brain must construct a representation before action is taken. Sometimes there is simply no time to do so. This is no different when it comes to understanding a conversation, especially when a joke is told. There is a preparation that must take place in order for the organism to act relatively easily within this cultural environment. But this preparation cannot occur in media res. The time constraints of a conversation do not afford us the luxury of constructing representations of everything at work in a conversation. But words do afford their users the means of participation-the preparation simply took place prior to the particular conversation. Conversing, after all, is a culturally learned skill with specific biological components, such as the important role of the vagus nerves in coordinating events within the organism through the facial musculature to express linguistic and non-linguistic information to other participants in the conversation.
Language and symbols are very much the extension of mind into the environment-but not as a representation. They are affordances. Our cultures have been developed to facilitate intelligent bodily activity, hopefully affording cultural organisms new opportunities to participate in new activities. A simple example of the cultural shift I have in mind is the effects of agriculture on urban life, where groups of people became able to focus on new activities and new problems because they were no longer primarily concerned with finding food. The information revolution we are currently undergoing, from the first personal computers to the latest smartphones, may produce a similar shift in possibilities.
Conclusion
Representationalism is difficult to evade because so much of the way we speak to each other about our thoughts, ideas, beliefs, dreams, etc., seems to presume a na ve correspondence between words and the world. On a pre-Darwinian view of human experience, such common sense may well have made good sense. But in light of our growing understanding of ourselves as products and participants in evolution, the role of representations is not only confused and atavistic but simplistic as well. By eradicating representations from our ways of thinking about human experience, we do not rid ourselves of intentionality. The divide between experience and nature, or mind and body, is not easily maintained, despite valiant efforts to do so. I believe a better approach to understanding the dynamic nature of intentionality is to reject the Cartesian premises behind much cognitive science today. The focus should not be on individual minds or brains, but on social organisms which grow out of cultural activities and produce new cultural artifacts. These artifacts are not mirrors of the past, nor representations of the present: they are imagined possibilities for the future. My contention is that we can evade the conceptual muddles at the heart of orthodox cognitive science today if we trade in representations for cultural affordances.
8 Such a trade will not be easy to accomplish, for Cartesianism creeps around every corner; but such a trade is one of the most promising alternatives to representationalism that does justice to our lived experience.
